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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
GENEVIEVE A. SMITH, JESSE E. SMITH,
BETH M. SMITH, and SALLI SMITH GIRARD,
Involuntary Defendants,
Pla1nt1ff and Respondent,)

Case No. 17661

vs.
CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHERINE R.
APPLEBY, DON BJARNSON, and GRACE
BJARNSON,
Defendants, Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs initially filed a Verified Complaint
seeking the forfeiture of a lease by reason of the Defendants'
alleged failure to maintain insurance on the premises as
required therein.

Plaintiffs also sought a temporary re-

straining order affirmatively requiring the Defendants to
maintain insurance during the pendency of the action.
Defendants/Appellants

The

[hereinafter "Appellants"] responded

claiming that they had timely cured the deficiency regarding
insurance pursuant to the terms and periods allowed by the
lease and that forfeiture should not be declared.

Appellants

also alleged that the Plaintiffs were aware and had consented
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to the lack of insurance and had waived and were estopped
from seeking a forfeiture by Plaintiffs' actions rnconsistent

therewith.

Lastly,

the Appellants counterclaimed

alleging that the Plaintiffs had violated several covenants
of the lease, and were in material breach thereof, Appellants
further seeking to establish their rights to quiet enjoyment
of the leasehold pursuant to its terms.
Prior to trial,

three of the four Plaintiffs

initially filing suit entered into a stipulation with the
Appellants to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice as to all
issues pertaining to them with the exception that the injunctive relief pertaining to the issuance of insurance
would continue.

These same parties also stipulated that

each party would bear his or her own attorney's fees and
costs.

The case was continued through trial by the remaining

Plaintiff and the Respondent herein, Salli Smith Girard, also
known as Salli Smith Girard Clinger. 1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In an initial series of findings, together with an
order dated March 6, 1981, the court declined to declare a
forfeiture of the lease finding that the alleged breaches,
if any, were not so substantial as to require the penalty of

1At trial, Mrs. Girard had remarried and testimony was given
under the name of Clinger.
2
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forfeiture insofar as the Plaintiff had now been placed in a
position as if no such breach had ever occured.

The court

further found that the continuing acceptance of rents by the
lessors constituted a waiver of their claim to the penalty
of forfeiture.

(R304)

With regard to the three named

Plaintiffs who had earlier stipulated to the dismissal of
the suit, the court declined to honor that dismissal and,
instead, joined them as involuntary parties Defendant. (See
Finding of Fact #2, R302-03; Rl62, Rl64)

Thereafter, without

motion, the lower court assumed the task of Respondent's
trial strategy and reopened the case, sua sponte, to take
testimony on Respondent Girard's attorneys' fees, upon which
issue no evidence had been given by Respondent at trial.
Respondent Girard then submitted two affidavits,
one by Mr. John L. Miles, counsel for Mrs. Girard, and one
by Ronald B. Boutwell, counsel for the other Plaintiffs, who
had been joined by the court as involuntary parties Defendant.
(R322, 337)
(R332-33)

Counsel for Appellant filed an opposing Affidavit.
Mr. Miles affidavit requested $350. 00 and Mr.

Boutwell's affidavit indicated that his attorney's fees were
$3,137.50.

(R338).

Thereafter, in a series of an additional

findings of fact dated the March 18, 1981, the court disregarded the affidavit filed by Appellants and awarded to the
Respondent Mrs. Girard the attorneys fees as set forth in
the affidavits of Mr. Miles, as well as Mr. Boutwell. (Finding
of Fact No. 16, R341)
3
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek modification of the judgment belo11
on the grounds that the attorneys' fees awarded to the
Respondent Clinger are not supported by any testimony properly
before the court.

Appellants seek reversal on the grounds

that there was no just cause to reopen the case without
motion and the court's judicial paternalism to the Respondent
Girard vicariously undertook her trial strategy, which was
best left to either of her two counsel at trial.

Appellants

further seek reversal of the attorney's fees on the further
ground that an award of an attorneys' fee, when the Appellants
had previously stipulated to the continuing issuance of the
injunction, which was the sole relief awarded at trial, is
inappropria~e.

Furthermore, Appellants seek reversal of the

attorney's fees awarded to Respondent Girard on the grounds
that that award to her for costs set forth by the Affidavit
of Mr. Boutwell, counsel for the involuntary parties defendant,
is without natural logic as there is no evidence before the
court as to any obligation of the Respondent Girard to pay
counsel for these involuntary parties who were again joined
without motion.
Lastly, Appellants seek reversal of that portion
of the court's judgment denying them their attorneys fees
as testified to at trial, such attorney's fees being expended
to sustain the leasehold and prevent the forfeiture of the
lease when a timely cure had been made.
4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose out of a lease initially executed
on the 23rd day of July, 1975, for a parcel of property near
Hurricane, Utah, commonly known as
Springs 11 •

11

Pah Tempe 11 or "The Hot

The property under lease is part of a canyon

within which there is a natural phenomenon of heated mineral
waters.

The initial Lessors were E. Penn Smith and Genevieve

A. Smith with the initial Lessees being Charles L. Appleby,
Jr., David E. Wood and Don Bjarnson and their wives.

Mr.

and Mrs. Wood later sold out to the Appleby's and Bjarnson's
and Mr. Smith later passed away so at the time of trial, the
Lessors interest were held in three equal shares as tenants
in common by Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and Salli
Smith Girard, also known at the time of trial as Salli Smith
Girard Clinger. (Partial Transcript, hereinafter PT30:1-5,15)
Initially drafted by the Lessors, the lease encouraged the Lessee to improve the property thereon and provided for a rental which combined both a flat rate and,
under certain circumstances, a percentage of the gross
receipts.

The parties also agreed that the premises and

facilities should be operated as a
putic spa 11 •

(See

P-3 at p. 3)

11

recreational and thera-

As relevant to Respondent's

cause of action filed below, paragraph 9 of the lease required the Lessees to maintain liability insurance in the
sum of $300,000 on the premises and paragraph 12 of the

5
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lease required either party to be responsible to the

~cn-de

faul ting party for reasonable attorney's fees incurred

"in

enforcing the terms of this agreement or exercising an2r
rights or remedies hereunder or any rights or remedies otherwise provided by law".

Paragraph 13 of the lease also pro-

vided that the Lessees had "thirty (30) days in which to
cure" any default in the terms of the lease.

(See P-3)

While the Respondent Girard has chosen to crossappeal without the benefit of a transcript, nonetheless, the
following facts can be gathered from the court's findings and
her testimony, which was prepared as part of a partial
transcript requested by the Appellants.

( R3 58, see also,

Clerks Certificate filed June 1, 1981) Appellants first came
on the leased premises and, as Respondent recalls, built a
living room, fireplace and bunk room.

(T78:25-28)

Respondent

also recalls the Lessees constructing two new bedrooms together with closets as an annex to the initial office space
on the premises.

(T79:26-29)

Other improvements constructed

by the Lessees consisted, in the Respondent's own words, of
an entirely new and modern cabin on the premises, picnic
tables, a wishing well and sprinklers substantially doubling
the earlier living space.

(T79:26-29; T83:5-9, 26-30; T87:1-SI

Additionally, Respondent Girard testified that the Lessees
had put cinders in the parking lot, placed a lighted sign on
the highway to the premises, repaired a gaping hole in the

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

grottos in the theraputic hot water areas, and repaired
crumbling plaster, replacing the same with a hand painted
mural around the pool area.

(T81:28-82:1; T81:8-ll; T84;

T86)
In early 1978, the cost of insuring the premises
with the previous insurer suddenly trebled and the Lessees
failed to renew their policy advising the Lessors of their
concern and requesting the Lessors' help to obtain an alternative source of insurance.
T72 at 30)

(T71:13-15; T40:3; T39:12-13;

Finally, on or about March 20, 1978, both Lessors

and Lessees were very actively concerned about getting insurance. (T39:5-7J

As a result, sometime in late March of 1978,

the Lessors sent Lessees an undated "Notice to Cure Defaults".
(P-4) Shortly thereafter, on May 8, 1978, the Lessors' attorney, Ronald Boutwell, filed a Verified Complaint on behalf of
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Beth M. Smith, his wife,
and Salli smith Girard.
In their first cause of action, Lessors alleged
that the Appellants were in default on their lease because
insurance, as required thereby, had not otherwise been obtained.

As a result of this allegation, the Respondent

claimed a forfeiture of the leasehold and an entitlement to
re-enter and take possession of the premises.

The second

cause of action, plead in equity, sought an immediate injunction of any activities on the leased premises unless
$300,000 of liability insurance was first obtained by Appellants.

(Rl-7)

While an unsigned copy of the "Notice to
7
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Cure Defaults" attached to the Complaint as Exhibit B referred to matters other than insurance, such matters were
not alluded to whatsoever within the pleadings in the complaint.

(Rl-8, 19-21)

And while the Appellants sought to

correct all of those matters mentioned in the "Notice to
Cure Defaults", they discovered that outside of those insurance matters plead in the complaint, the Lessors also had
no information whatsoever upon which the other matters set
forth in the "Notice to Cure Defaults 11 were framed.

In the

Respondent Girard' s own words at trial, she admitted not
knowing what violations other than those of insurance,
fact, existed until January of 1981. (T68-69)

in

Mrs. Girard

later explained the Lessors 1 lack of knowledge as follows:
Well, Mr. Boutwell filed this and he told us
that there were no doubts codes were being
broken, but we were not told what specific
codes. (T69:25-27)
On August 17th of 1978, Defendants filed their
answer and counterclaim pertaining to the insurance issues
raised in the complaint, pleading estopple and waiver among
their affirmative defenses and further denying those allegations pertaining to their alleged bad faith refusal to get
insurance.

Defendants further alleged that they had properly

cured the default within the time allowed pursuant to the
lease and counterclaimed alleging some material breaches of
the lease by Lessors.

( R44)

Respondent 1 s reply to the

counterclaim was not filed until 15 months later and the

8
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counterclaim itself was not actively pursued at trial. (R72,
Findings of Fact 11 and 12, R305)
While the Lessors,

pending trial, continually

alluded to alleged health code violations, they never clarified what these were until the day of trial.

And, while

Lessors' counsel had ample opportunity over a period of over
three years to amend their complaint, no motion was ever
made prior to trial, and thus, matters outside of those
allegations pertaining to insurance were not properly before
the court.
With regard to insurance, the partial transcript
ordered by the Appellants contains the testimony of Mr.
Douglas Labrum 2 who was retained by Appellants to obtain
insurance on the premises.
the following:

Mr. Labrum's testimony reveals

First, that after delivery of the Notice to

Cure Defaults, Mr. Donald Bjarnson, one of the Lessees,
approached Mr. Labrum very anxious to obtain insurance in
March of 1978.

(T20:19)

Labrum described Bjarnson's atti-

tude as "eager", indicating that Bjarnson literally barraged
the insurance agency with phone calls in order to obtain
rnsurance.

(PT16; 19; 20-23) Labrum thereafter indicated

that the first coverage on the Hot Springs was obtained by
reason of a binder issued March 19, 1978 (PT14:26-28)

and

2Labrum was called by Respondent Girard as her witness.
9
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that this binder was good for thirty days.

(PT35:H-18)

Labrum also testified that it is often conceivable that
binders do not result in the ultimate issuance of a policy
and that the insurance company often sends engineers to
check the risk and to give the property owners a list of
things which need to be corrected prior to the policy being
issued (PT15:6-8; 19:20-29; 28:13-24)

While Mr. Bjarnson's

instructions were to do everything possible to maintain
insurance on the premises, it was clear that at times binders
were rejected and checks made out to Mr. Labrum from the
Lessees were returned. (PT21:1-5, 12-15)

The nature of the

resort made it difficult for the agent to place the coverage.
(PT20:28-30)
Regardless of the difficulty in placing insurance,
Labrum later testified that between March and the date of
trial, there were only two periods rn which no coverage
existed; one being a twelve day period beginning April 27,
1978 and the other being a thirty day period between June 20
and July 20 subsequent to the filing of the cause of action
in May of 1978.

(PT15:20-25; 17:25-30; 18:4-8)

Upon cross

examination, however, Labrum recanted his earlier testimony
and indicated that coverage was extended through June 20 and
that the only lapse of coverage after March 19, 1978 occurred
between June 20 and July 20, 1978, that period being clearly
subsequent to the filing of the complaint. (See Rl; PT18:14-30;
19:1-3, 19-30; PT22:13-20; PT22:26-23:1) The basis for Labrum
10
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recanting his earlier testimony was a memo in his own file
from the insurance company's agent and underwriter, which
extended coverage on the basis of an engineer's view of the
premises through June 20.

(Id; PT22:26-23:1; PT20:1-9)

After July 20, there was continuous coverage up through the
date of trial.

(PT17:30-18:3)

Ultimately, the policy was

actually issued on September 28, 1978 with Mr. Bj ams on
instructing Mr. Labrum to make his files open and available
at all times to any of the Lessors. (PT23: 29-30; 27: 26-30)
In early 1980, Mr. Boutwell withdrew his counsel
for Salli Smith Girard Clinger.

Ultimately, John L. Miles

filed a formal notice of appearance on her behalf on
September 2, 1980.

(Rll7)

In November of 1980, Boutwell met with all of the
Plaintiffs, including Mrs. Girard, and his clients made it
clear that they were satisfied that the Lessees had complied
with their demands for insurance and wanted the suit dismissed. (PT48:ll-20)

Thereafter, Boutwell called the Appel-

lants' attorney advising him that he believed all of the
Plaintiffs were going to dismiss the suit.

On December 8,

1980, the Plaintiffs Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and
Beth M. Smith, through their attorney Ronald Boutwell, and
the Defendants, Appellants herein, by and through their
attorney, Michael D. Hughes, stipulated as follows:
1.
That the complaint as to the stipulating
parties be dismissed with prejudice as to
those issues raised on behalf of the three
stipulating Plaintiffs.
11
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2.
That the injunction requiring Defendants
[Appellants] to maintain insurance CO'lerage
remain in full force and effect, not berng
dismissed with the dismissal of the complaint.
3.
That each party bear hi.s or her own
costs and expenses incurred in the action.
(Rl61)
This stipulation arose as a direct result of the earlier
meeting at which the remaining Plaintiff [Respondent) Salli
Smith Girard was present, and, though the stipulation was
referred to on two different occasions on the law and motion
calendar, a copy of the same was inadvertantly not mailed to
Mr. Miles, counsel for the remaining Plaintiff, Salli Smith
Girard.

A partial dismissal with prejudice reflecting the

stipulation appears in the record at 164 and indicates that
the complaint be dismissed with prejudice as for Plaintiffs
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and Beth M. Smith, but
that the preliminary injunction remain in full force and
effect and that no costs and attorney's fees be assessed
against any of the parties to the stipulation.

(Rl64)

During the pendency of these proceedings, all of
the Plaintiffs, including Mrs. Girard, continued to accept
rents from the Appellants herein for the leasehold premises.
(PT63:23-24; Finding of Fact No. 7, R304-05)

At the time of

trial, the three named Plaintiffs, Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse

E. Smith and Beth M. Smith, did not appear as parties, but
merely as witnesses.

They all represented to the court that

they did not desire to be parties to the law suit.

The

court upon hearing that evidence, found that such was the
12
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case.

(Finding of Fact No. 2, 302-03)

While Mr. Boutwell

testified as a witness at trial, he also did not participate
as counsel.

Thus, in the partial transcript there is no

reflection of any direct or cross examination conducted ty
Mr. Boutwell,

despite the Appellants'

partial transcript contain

11

request that the

[a]ll direct and cross examination

conducted by Ronald B. Boutwell." (See clerk's certificate
filed June 1, 1981, together with attachments.)
During the trial, the Respondent, Mrs. Girard, who
was represented by both Mr. Miles and Mr. Wright, moved to
amend the complaint and proceed on another theory involving
health code violations based upon information tendered to
the Appellants on the morning of the trial and filed that
same date with the court. (Rl72-l83)

This information was

tendered only after the Appellant had strenuously urged a
clarification of Mrs. Girard' s position through several
earlier discovery motions. (See PTl-8)
the difficulty as to obtaining

thi~

Mrs. Girard explained
information, stating

that she did not know the exact nature of the cause of
action she chose to plead even until the month of trial.
(T68:28-69:10; PT69:25-27)

As a result of Plaintiff Girard's

failure to clarify her position and to formally amend her
cause of action, and, further, as a result of the late
tender of any discovery thereon, the Appellants objected
strenuously throughout trial to the amendment of any pleadings
to raise causes of actions not properly framed and before
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the court.

While the court allowed such testimony to enter

into the record, it noted the Appellants' counsel's continuing
objection to all testimony pertaining to matters outside of
the relevant insurance questions. (PT32:28; 33:7-14)

Plain-

tiff Girard, on the other hand, asserted that her cause of
action as recently discovered by her was fairly plead by
reference to the Notice to Cure Default attached as an exhibit
to the original complaint.

Ultimately, the court in accor-

dance with Chesney v. Chesney, 33 Utah 503, 94 Pac. 989
(1908), sustained Appellants' objection and excluded from its
ruling all matters pertaining to causes not formally raised
by the pleadings and not tried by consent.
During the trial, Respondent Girard also sought to
introduce testimony pertaining to matters which had occurred
on the leased premises only two or three months prior to trial.
At best, the major thrust of her lawsuit pertained to the
lapse in insurance from June 20 through July 20, 1978 despite
the fact that the verified complaint again was filed on May
8, 1978,

some six weeks before the alleged material breach

occured.

Appellants again objected to the court taking

evidence on facts occuring

~fter

the filing of a complaint

since Respondent's cause of action must exist either at the
time of filing of the complaint or not at all.

This position,

framed in reference to the Costagno v. Nyman case, No. 16905
(Utah, filed in September 24, 1980) was rejected by the court,
though the Appellants firmly believed that they had cured the
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default in securing insurance as was reflected by the testimony of Doug Labrum at trial.
At the end of Respondent Girard's case, both of
her attorney's rested having presented no evidence on attorney's fees. (Finding of Fact number 8, R305)

The Appel-

lants finished their rebuttal of the Plaintiff's case and
their counsel was then sworn to testify as to his attorney's
fees in defending the lease from forfeiture.

His testimony

established that a reasonable fee in the instant case on
Appellants behalf would be $2,000.
On

(PT92:18-93:2)

cross-examination of Appellants'

counsel,

Respondent Girard' s counsel attempted to establish her
attorney's fees in the following manner:
You consider that, then, ($2,000] a
reasonable amount, is that right, Mr. Hughes?

Q:

A:

For my services, yes.

And that would be a reasonable sum,
then, for attorneys on the opposing side?

Q:

A:
I couldn't testify to your case in
direct, Mr. Wright.

Q:
My question is, that figure would be a
reasonable figure, don't you think?
A:
I have no way of knowing what your
billing system is at your office.
That would .be a reasonable fee for an
attorney, would it not?

Q:

A:
For my services, yes.
(R93:5-19)
It was clear from the above cross examination that
both of Respondent Girard's counsel realized they had failed
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to present any testimony on Respondent's attorneys' fees at
trial and were trying to inferentially put sufficient testimony into evidence by the cross-examination of Appellants'
counsel.

Nonetheless, Respondent's counsel did not move to

reopen the case and present evidence on their attorney's
fees, apparently declining to do so as part of their trial
strategy.

Whatever the reason, this is a decision uniquely

left to counsel as part of the adversary process.
After the trial, the district court set aside its
own order of dismissal based upon the prior stipulation and
rejoined Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith and Beth M.
Smith to the action as involuntary parties defendant. (Rl62,
164, Finding of Fact number 2, R302-3)

Thereafter, the

court dissallowed those amendments to the cause of action
proposed by Respondent Girard during trial, holding that the
evidence presented thereon throughout trial had been subject
to the continuing objection of Appellants' counsel and that
there was no reason produced for the Respondents not having
formally moved to amend prior to trial. (Finding of Fact No.
4, R303-04)

In failing to allow the amendment, the court

noted that its action was well within its discretion under
Rule 15 U.R.C.P. (Id.)

All testimony received pertainir-g to

those causes of action, and all objections relating to the
tes~imony

and exhibits pertaining to those causes of action

were thereafter sustained. (1..9..)

16
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Despite Appell ants cure within the time alloted
within the lease pursuant to the testimony of Doug Labrum,
the court found, nonetheless, that there had been a breach
of the lease, but that the same was not sufficient to justify
a forfeiture of the leasehold. (Findings of Fact 6 and 7,
R304-305)

These findings were based on the court's judgment

that a penalty of the nature sought after by Respondent
Girard was disproportionate to her claimed losses and that
the Lessors as a whole had been placed in a equivalent
position as if the breach "relatively short in duration" had
not occurred. (Id.)

The court further found that all of the

Lessors had accepted rent consistent with their desire to
continue their status under the terms of the leasehold.
(Id.)

Appellant's attorney's fees previously testified
to at trial in sustaining the lease and avoiding forfeiture
were

anomalously denied.

Nonetheless,

without further

motion, the court, in an act of judicial paternalism, reopened the case to receive evidence as to the Respondent's
attorney's fees, finding that her omission of any evidence
thereon may have been caused, in part, by

R~spondent's

own

pursuit of causes of action not properly before the court.
This reopening of the case weeks after trial was directly
contrary to the Appellants' interest and directly favorable
to the interests of Respondent.

Again, the case was reopened

without motion and, despite the court's finding that the
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omission was somewhat inadvertant,

or perhaps caused by

Respondent's own attorneys' efforts to amend during trial. it
is clear that the court was in error in actively assuming the
position of Respondent Girard's trial strategist.
ney's cross-examination of Appellants counsel,

Her attorante pp.

15-16, clearly revealed that they were well aware of this
ommission.
While the court invited Respondent's counsel to
optionally present further testimony on attorney's fees,
Respondent's attorneys chose to bear their burden of proof by
submitting two affidavits, one by Mr. Miles testifying to
$350.00 attorney's fees and the other by Mr. Boutwell, who,
similar to his clients had not appeared at trial other than
as a witness.

(R322, 337)

Again, it cannot be gainsaid that

Boutwell conducted no direct or cross examination at trial.
(See clerk's certificate filed June 1, 1981, together with
attachments, and PT)

Mr. Boutwell's affidavit stated that he

had incurred attorney's fees of $3,137.50. (R338)

Appellants'

counsel filed an opposing affidavit indicating that in light
of the Appellants' cooperation in obtaining insurance, a
reasonable attorney's fee on Respondent's behalf could be no
more than $250.00.

(R332-33)

In a series of additional findings filed on March
18, 1981, the court awarded the remaining Plaintiff, Salli
Smith Girard, the sum of 53,487.50 in attorneys fees simply
adding those figures submitted by John L. Miles and Ronald E.
18
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Boutwell.

(R340-41, No. 16)

This finding came despite the

fact that Mr. Boutwell did not represent Mrs. Girard and had
earlier stipulated on behalf of all of his clients that each
party represented by him would bear their own costs and
expenses incurred in the action. ( Rl62)

Again this stipu-

lation was reflected by an order executed by the court.
(Rl6..J:)
The court further found that the attorney's fees
were awardable to the Respondent Girard because trial of the
matter had resulted in the finding that a "breach of the
insurance covenant had occured, and that a permanent injunction could issue, without bond." (R341)

Again, however,

Appellants had already stipulated that the injunction continue,
and the bond required by an earlier order of the court on
September 12, 1978, was only $500.00, or approximately oneseventh of the attorney's fees awarded.

(Rl62, 164; R67-68)

Ultimately, the award of attorney's fees was a conclusion
perhaps foreshadowed by the court's own assumption of Respondent's trial strategy.

Having personally reopened the case

on Respondent Girard's behalf, it perhaps begs the question
to ask why the opposing affidavit of Appellant's counsel
pertaining to an appropriate attorney's fees on Respondent's
behalf was given no evidentiary weight and the two affidavits
of Mr. Miles and Mr. Boutwell, which were not subject to
cross examination, were accorded full evidentiary value.
As a result of the foregoing rulings, this apppeal
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was taken on behalf of Appellants to reverse the award of
attorney's fees on Respondent Girard' s behalf and again
reverse that denial of attorney's fees requested by Appellants and testified to at trial by their counsel.

This

appeal contends that the system of justice in Utah is basically adversarial and that counsel must ultimately take the
responsibility for trial strategy, it being inappropriate for
the court to reach out and assume the task of deciding an
issue contrary to one party's interest when no evidence has
been presented during trial upon that issue.
APPELLANTS' POINTS ON APPEAL

POINT I
THERE IS NO TESTIMONY PROPERLY REGARDED AS
.
SUCH UPON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT a5P0°vJ
GIRARD MAY BE AWARDED ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES.

At the close of trial, Respondent Girard rested her
case without giving any testimony on attorney's fees and
without requesting to reopen her case to present testimony to
pursue that matter. (Findings of Fact No. 8, R305)

Despite

the fact that the Respondent Girard bore the burden of proof
at all stages of the trial to present testimony on this
matter and failed to do so, the lower court, sua sponte,
reopened the case after a series of findings dispositive of
the material issues in the suit. (R302-06)

This case was

reopened solely to provide Mrs. Girard the opportunity to
bear the burden of proof on the issue of her attorney's
20
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fees, upon which no evidence had been presented at trial.
Her attorneys chose to bear this burden by the presentation
of affidavits which were contraverted by an opposing affidavit in the lecord.

(R322-24, 337-39, & 332-34)

Thereafter,

the court simply chose to disregard the contradictory affidavit of Appellant's counsel and awarded attorney's fees
based upon the affidavits of John L. Miles, counsel for Mrs.
Girard,

and Ronald B. Boutwell, who filed an affidavit

regarding his attorney's fees but did not articulate whether
Mrs. Girard was indebted to him or whether, in fact, he had
been paid, either by her, or his other clients who had
continuously requested dismissal from the suit.
As there was no stipulation on an appropriate
attorney's fee, the award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Girard
in the instant case should be reversed since, simply stated,
it was not

11

based on sworn testimony" properly subject to

cross examination at trial.

See Aiken v. Burrows, 30 Utah

2d ll6, 514 P.2d 533 (1973).
In the early case of Crooks v. Harmon, 29 Utah
304, 81 Pac. 95 (1905), Cheif Justice Bartch speaking for
the Supreme Court said:
The word 'testimony' is a restricted, limited
term, consisting only of the statements of
witnesses, while the word. 'evidence' is a.
comprehensive term, embracing not only testimony, or the stat~ments. of witnesses, but.
also documents, written instruments, admissions
of parties, and whatever may be submitted to
a court or jury to elucidate an issue or
prove a case. 81 Pac. at 96
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Similarly,

three years later, Che if Justice McCarthy

in

Carter v. Cummings-Neilson Co., 34 Utah 315, 97 Pac. 335
( 1908), stated the following in defining the word

"testirnc~..

The word 'testimony', when used as it is in
the foregoing certificate, is not synonomous
with evidence. The former refers to and
includes one species of evidence, namely, the
oral statements made by witnesses while
testifying; whereas, the latter is a generic
term, and includes any species of evidence or
proof submitted to a court or jury rn the
trial of a case. 97 Pac at 335.
That the word testimony continues to be a restrictive term
is clear in the recent Idaho case of Comish v. Smith, 97
Idaho 89, 540 P.2d 274 (1975), wherein the Idaho Supreme
Court confirms that "testimony" is "merely a species of
evidence which is produced by oral statements of the witness.'
540 P.2d at 278
In the instant case, there was no testimony presented on attorney's fees during trial.

Respondent Girard's

counsel failed to open the case before closing argument or
even before the initial findings of fact were entered to put
on testimony subject to cross examination, thus waiving her

claim to the same.

The court's award, therefore, is based

on contested affidavits filed subsequent to trial, such
affidavits being invited by the court's own solicitous
ruling.

As the burden of proof to sustain an appropriate

award of attorney's fees is Respondent's, this Court should
reverse and reject the judgment for attorney's fees as there
is no stipulation or "testimony" as such upon which the
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appropriate award may be based.

It is clear from the partial

transcript of trial that the Respondent Girard' s counsel
knew they had failed to present evidence thereon, strenuously
attempting to establish their attorney's fees through the
testimony of opposing counsel.

(PT at 93:6-21)

Failing to

do that, they also neglected to appropriately reopen the
case.

The lower court's subsequent indulgence of the Respon-

dent in reopening the case for her, harmed the Appellants,
and is much too close to overt advocacy favorable to one
party.

Further, the contested affidavits presented therein

are simply not sufficient upon which to base an award of
attorney's fees, not being otherwise subject to cross examination.
POINT I I
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED BY THE JUDGE ARE
CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATION ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN APPELLANTS' COUNSEL AND COUNSEL FOR
THE INVOLUNTARY DEFENDANTS, RONALD BOUTWELL,
UPON WHOSE AFFIDAVIT THE LARGEST PORTION OF
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS BASED.
Initially this suit was pursued by four Plaintiffs,
three of which have a present interest in the Hot Springs.
(Rl, PT at 30:1-15)

Attorney Ronald B. Boutwell represented

all of the Plaintiffs in the action at its inception.
On September 12, 1978, a preliminary injunction as
to the operation of the resort was issued.

(R 67, 68) The

insurance problem, which had been raised in both the notice
to cure and the complaint was already in the process of being
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resolved among the parties at that time, first, with the
issuance of binders and ultimately by the issuance of a
policy on September 28, 1978.

(PT at 23:29-30)

By November of 1980, Mr. Jesse Smith, his wife Beth
Smith and Mrs. Genevieve Smith informed their attorney, Mr.
Boutwell, that they intended to pursue the case no further.
(PT48:11-20)

Thereafter, Mr. Boutwell, acting at his clients'

request, secured a stipulation from Appellants' attorney in
which all of the parties to that stipulation agreed as follows:
(1) that the Complaint on file be dismissed with prejudice as
it relates to issues raised on behalf of the three Plaintiffs
previously named; (2) that the injuction requiring Defendants
[Appellants herein] to maintain insurance coverage on the
leased premises remain in full force and effect; and (3) that
each party bear his or her own costs and expenses incurred in
this action.

Executed on December 8, 1980, this stipulation

appears in the record at page 162.

Prior to executing the

same, Boutwell had already informed Mrs. Girard that it would
be in her best interest to find a new attorney since it would
be difficult for him to continue to represent her as a result
of the anticipated settlement by the other plaintiffs.

At

trial, the stipulating Plaintiffs stated to the court that
they did not want to be parties to the law suit, but the
court joined them as involuntary defendants, again without
motion.

(Finding of Fact No.2, R302-03)
At trial, Mr. Miles and Mr. Wright represented the
24
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Respondent herein; Mr. Boutwell, not only did not represent
Mrs. Girard, but did not even appear in the case as counsel.
In its initial series of findings and order when the court
reopened the case, it invited Mr. Wright and Mr. Miles to
present evidence pertaining to their attorney's fees.

Their

firm then prepared an affidavit for Mr. Boutwell's signature
which states that he was at one time the attorney for all
the Plaintiffs and that the sum of $3, 137. 50 would be a
reasonable attorney's fees for him in the above entitled
matter.

(R 337-39)

While Plaintiff Girard' s counsel had

successfully moved to set aside the stipulation executed by
the other co-plaintiffs, neither they nor their attorney, Mr.
Boutwell, joined in that motion. (Finding of Fact No. 2,
R302-03; R210)

Furthermore, the affidavit of Boutwell at no

point indicates that Mrs. Girard is indebted to him for that
amount or that that sum has been paid by her.

In fact, logic

and equity would indicate that his attorney's fees at best,
would have to be divided equally between his clients.

None-

theless, the court in awarding attorney's fees awarded the
remaining Plaintiff, Mrs. Girard, all of those attorney's
fees set forth in Ronald B. Boutwell's affidavit despite the
fact that three of his four clients stipulated that they
would be responsible for their own costs and expenses. (See
Finding of Fact No. 16, R341; Rl62, 164)
While Respondent Girard's attorneys moved to set
aside the order of the court based upon the stipulation at
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Rl64, their motion was framed on the premise that the stipulating Plaintiffs needed to be rejoined

in

the lawsmt.

While the court did rejoin those parties, it is evident that
they did not desire to be part of the trial by the Findings
of Fact entered thereon.

(Finding of Fact No. 2, R302-03J

Nonetheless, the court's refusal to honor that portion of the
stipulation relating to those parties bearing their own costs
and expenses is reversable error.

Simply stated, once a

stipulation is signed, it becomes part of the record of the
case, having the same effect and potency as an order of the
Court agreed to by the parties thereto. 83 C.J.S. Stipulations
§6 (1953)

While apparently the court did not choose to be
bound by the stipulation in the instant case, the court
should, nonetheless, have disregard that portion of Boutwell's
affidavit relating to attorney's fees charged to all four
clients which at one time were represented by him.
in Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,

As stated

524 P.2d 271 (Alaska

1974):

An attorney retain.ed in .negotiating the t.erms
of an agreement binds his client to promises
made within the scope of that authority. Id.
at 275.
Again, there is no indiciation in Mr. Boutwell's affidavit
what portion of those fees sought in this affidavit are
properly assessable on behalf of the remaining
Mrs. Girard.

Plaint~ff,

(R337-39)
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In the stipulation bearing Mr. Boutwell's signatures, is the statement "each party hereto shall bear his or
her own costs and expenses incurred in this action." (Rl62)
This statement implies that each party to the stipulation
will equally absorb the expense of the action.

The logical

assumption in the instant case is that Boutwell's clients
would equally di vi de the initial costs of securing their
rights.

Nonetheless, the court's ruling has awarded to the

remaining Plaintiff, Mrs. Girard, all of those attorney's
fees incurred by Mr. Boutwell in representing all four
plaintiffs.

As the result, Boutwell' s affidavit, which

neither divides the attorney's fees between his clients or
indicates that Mrs. Girard is obligated to him for that
amount or, in fact, any amount or whether she is indebted to
him at all should be disregarded.

(R 337-39)

Boutwell' s

earlier acquiescence to the stipulation that each party
should bear his or her own costs would seemingly disqualify
the larger portion of his fees testified to as being assessable at this time against the Appellants.

(Rl62)

The

court's holding the Appellants responsible for all of Boutwell' s fees, including those generated for clients who did
not participate in the trial as parties and who chose to
settle the case with Appellants is patently in error.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
SUA SPONTE REOPENING THE CASE ON THE ISSUE OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED UPON A FINDING OF FACT,
27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WHICH FINDING WAS NEITHER RAISED, PLEAD OR
ARGUED BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AND WHICH
FINDING IS NOT SUFFICIENT UNDER RULE 61 OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TO OTHERWISE
OPEN CASES TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE.
The lower court has no justification in the case
at bar for sua sponte reopening the case for the presentation of evidence on the issue of attorney's fees.

While

the reopening of cases to preserve the furtherance of justice
is allowable,

in this instance the court has abused its

discretion for lack of good reason.
Ordinarily a case is only reopened, subject to
court's discretion, on a motion by counsel.

t~

While the Court

may indulge a variety of considerations on a motion to
reopen, it should grant or deny the motion in light of all
the circumstances pertaining to fairness and substantial
justice.

6 J. Moore's Federal Practice,

~59.04[13]

(2nd Ed.

1976) quoted in Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976)
Rule 61 U.R.C.P. indicates those standards to be considered
in reviewing whether the exclusion of evidence is sufficient
error to consider disburbing a judgment.

Thus, only where

the refusal of the Court to take action would appear to be
inconsistent with "substantial justice" will judgment be
disturbed. (.!i.)

Otherwise, the Rule instructs:

"The Court

at every stage of the proceeding must disregard error or
defect

in the proceeding which does

substantial rights of the parties."

not affect the

Rule 61, U. R. C. P.

In the present case the resultant denial of Re-
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spondent' s counsel's attorney's fees bottomed on their
failure to put on testimony of the nature and value of such
services can hardly be considered a denial of substantial
justice to the Respondent or her attorneys.

Simply stated,

a judgment denying Respondent her attorneys' fees is the
natural and logical consequence of her counsels' failure to
testify thereon.

Further, their absent testimony is totally

irrelevant to the material relief afforded by the judgment.
Nonetheless, the lower court below disregarded the appropriate
parameters of Rule 61, and assumed a position much akin to
Respondent's advocate in personally reopening the case to
thereafter assess against the Appellants over $3, 000 in
attorney's fees.

And, as the court reopened the case, sua

sponte, the Appellants did not even have an opportunity to
resist the ruling.
As previously alluded to, while the consideration
as to whether or not to reopen is discretionary, thereby
granting considerable latitude of judgment to the court,
this does not mean unrestrained power to act
in a capricious or arbitrary manner which may
produce an inequitable or unjust result. The
word "discretion" its elf imports the action
should be taken with reason and in good conscience, and with an understanding of a.nd
consideration for the rights of the parties,
for the purpose of serving the always desired
objective of doing justice between them.
Davis v. Rile~, 20 Utah 2d 325, 437 P.2d 453,
455 (1968).ee also Gardner v. Christensen,
622 P.2d 782 (Utah 198 .
Such discretion does not justify in this instance the assumption by the lower court of the role of advocate when
29
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error has been made by counsel

111

the establishing of e·il-

dence on attorney's fees.
In a recent Utah case, Judge Stewart, in his concurring opinion, rndicated that courts should not reach "out
and

. [assume] the task of deciding an issue contrary to

one party's interest when the issue has not been litigated.'
Continuing, he stated:
I have no doubt that the administration of
justice is likely to be greatly enhanced when
trial judges act not solely as passive arbiters but, when occasion demands, become involved to assure the just outcome of a cause.
But in the end, our system of justice is
basically adversarial, and counsel must
ultimately take the responsibili tv for the
trial strategv. Dixion v. Stoddara, 627 P.2d
83, 84 (Utah 1981 .
Here the court gratuitously provided a mechanism
whereby counsel,
error.

at his convenience, could rectify his

It is a general rule in most jurisdictions to permit

a plaintiff or any party to a suit, after resting his case,
to add to his proof, is a practice not to be encouraged.
Jones,

Evidence,

§809 (3rd ed.)

See also Parmenter v.

Ranson, 169 P.2d 883 (Oregon 1946); Hall v. Hickey, 319 P.2d
33

(Cal.

1957);

O'Mally v. United Producers & Consumers

Coop., Inc., 95 Ariz. 134, 387 P.2d 1016 (1964).

The Justi-

fication for this proposition is posited on the seasoned
reasoning that each party after having a full and complete
opportunity to develop his case, once resting, has voluntarily foregone his right to introduce fresh evidence.
Producers & Consumers Ccop. v. O'Mall'!,
30
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P.2d 575 (1968); Maass v. Peterson, 204 P.2d 1040 (Mont.
1949).
While this reasoning may be considered unacceptable
in response to a timely motion from counsel, herein no such
motion to reopen was made.

Cf. Gardner v. Christensen, 622

P.2d 782 at 784 (Utah 1980).
The lower court in reopening solicitously speculated that there may have been some confusion by Respondent's
counsel as to what issues actually were before the court.
This speculation is not well taken.

Such confusion, if any,

was self-inflicted by these same counsel in their desire to
pursue issues not properly framed before the court.

Never-

theless, the burden of proof remained with counsel to establish attorney's fees.
As stated in Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2d 325, 437
P.2d 453 (1968), any discretion exercised in a capricious
and arbitrary manner, producing an inequitable or unjust result, would be an appropriate candidate for review.

There

can be no question that the result as to the issue of attorney's fees in this case was unjust.

There was no evidentiary

basis upon which the court could award attorney's fees prior
to the submission of affidavits which were not allowed as a
result of any motion by opposing counsel, but as a result of
an unsolicited finding of the court as to the opposing
counsel's confusion.

Such unilateral advocacy as herein
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exercised by the trial court exemplifies Black 1 s 3 def1
of "arbitrary" as being

"'.·il thout

fair, solid and substantiai

cause; that is w1 thout cause based upon the law.''

~

Lotempio, 58 F.2d 358, 359. (D.N.Y.; W.D. 1931)
The trial court committed reversable error in reopening the case on the basis of a finding the Plaintiff's
counsel was confused, which argument was

ne~er

raised, plead

or argued by Plaintiff, nor is considered a valid rat1onal2
for the amending of a judgment under Rule 61, U.R.C.P.
POINT IV
THE RELIEF AFFORDED THE REMAINING PLAINTIFF
AT TRIAL IS NO GREATER THAN THJl.T TO WHICH THE
DEFENDANT STIPULATED WELL IN ADV.A.NCE OF
TRIAL.
On December 8, 1980, three Plaintiffs stipulated
to a dismissal with prejudice of the case at bar.
164)

( Rl62,

That stipulation granted these Plaintiffs an extension

of the original preliminary injunction, which had been
issued on September 12, 1978. (Ii.:_)
"[t)hat the

The stipulation statej

Injunction requiring Defendant to maintain

insurance coverage on the leased premises, which are the
subject

of

this

action,

shall remain in full force and

effect and shall not be dismissed with the dismissal of the
Complaint."

(Rl62)

The December 8,

1980 stipulation indicated that

there had been a previous "inJ unction" to the one which was

3 Blacks Law Dictionary 96 (5th Ed. 1979)
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entered into by the stipulation.

That injunction was a

preliminary injunction ordered on September 12, 1978, supported by Plaintiffs' nominal bond of $500 "for the payment
of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by
any party who is found to be wrongfully enjoined or restrained."

(R68, emphasis added.)
At the time of the December 8, 1980 stipulation,

Appellants stipulated to extend this injunction indefinitely,
no mention of any bond being made.

And, as is the general

rule, when an injunction is made permanent, the requirement
of a bond is not applicable, the parties having stipulated
that the relief is appropriate and not wrongful.

School

Board of Consol. Dist. No. 36 v. Edwards, 87 P. 2d 962, 968
(Okla. 1939).

Moreover, it is a requirement that can be

"waived or dispensed with by stipulation of the party enjoined, or his counsel".

Laundry Dry Cleaning, Dye House

Workers Union v. Laundry International Union, 4 Wis.2d 542,
91 N.W.2d 320, 328 (1958).
Thus, Finding of Fact No. 9 entered by the Court
on March 6, 1981, which makes the September 28, 1978 preliminary injunction "permanent" grants no greater relief than
that to which the Appellants had earlier stipulated.

(R305;

cf. Rl62)
The court's explanation that he found no indication
in the file that the Appellants had stipulated to a "permanent"
injunction is lexically correct, but legally meaningless.
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( R34, ll 1io

)

The s tipul a tlon executed

in

December that the

injunction "remain in full force and effect and . . . not tc
dismissed with the dismissal

of the Complaint" cleari 1
reflects the intent and understanding that the injunction te

permanent.

Thus,

while the Judge may see the judgment

awarded as technically different from the stipulation,
result they are the same.

in

Those attorneys' fees expended b7

Respondent Girard in obtaining by trial a remedy no greater
than that to which the Appellants had already stipulated
should be denied.

Rather,

the Respondent's efforts to

forfeit the lease resulted in a lengthy trial which the
Appellants successfully defended, only to be assessed attorney's fees after the trial.
POINT V
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF
BASED UPON AFFIDAVITS TO WHICH THERE WERE
CONTRARY AFFIDAVITS IN THE FILE AS TO BOTH
THE ISSUES OF AMOUNT AND REASONABLENESS IS
IMPROPER UNDER BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDEN CE APPLICABLE TO ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
AND AMOUNTS TO TRYING ISSUES BY AFFIDAVIT.
The Supreme Court of Utah in discussing the foundation upon which attorney's fees could be awarded concluded
in

Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.,

537

P. 2d 1039

(Utah 1975) that attorney's fees cannot be awarded without
either a "stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted aff:davi t or evidence given as to the value thereof."

537 F.2d

This case substantially delineate 5

at 1040 (emphasis added).
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the line which must be drawn in considering an affidavit as
sufficient evidence of attorney's fees.
Even when not contradicted by opposing affidavits,
affidavits are "commonly regarded as weak evidence, to be
received with caution" 32A C.J.S., Evidence,

§

1052 at 706

(1964) See also Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal. 2d 144, 173 P.2d 657,
660, (1946); Audit Services, Inc. v. Kraus Construction, Inc.
615 P.2d 183 (Mont. 1980).

Thus, where an objection has

been made "to an affidavit as evidence and where there is a
contest involved and where the effect of an adverse order
was tantamount to a judgment for money, proof of facts may
not be made by ex parte affidavits without the right of
cross-examination."
869 (Mont. 1946).

Stenfonick v. Stenfonick, 167 P.2d 867,
In actuality such treatment of affidavits

is only a mechanism to see such documents in their true
light as self-serving statements drawn up by representative
counsel.

Thus, an affidavit should be used only when testi-

mony is cumulative or of minor importance, not as in this
instance where the outcome of the issue is directly dependent
on the document.

Lee Wayne Co. v. Pruitt, 550 P.2d 1374,

1375 (Okla. 1976).

See also Smith v. Miller, 213 Kan. l,

514 P.2d 377 (1973).
Such a situation presented here is analogous to a
Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment.

There, where contra-

dicting affidavits are pesented to the court, the selecting
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of one affidavit over another affidavit filed by an opponent
is, in short, grossly inappropriate.
The award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiff on
the basis of rebutted affidavits is a violation of the level
of proof required to sustain such an award.

The fact that

the affidavits themselves are inappos1 te precludes judicial
selection of one over another as the sole foundation to a
finding of fact.

! See R322, 332, and 337)

Simply stated,

the affidavits of Mr. Miles and Mr. Boutwell were not unrebutted.

A third affidavit contested not only the

viabili~

of the award, but the appropirate amount thereof, raising a
factual issue which precludes a choice of one affidavit over
another on the basis of the cold record.
POINT VI
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS'
ATTORNEY'S FEE IN TRYING IN LARGE PART ISSUES
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND IN SUCCESSFULLY RESISTING FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE WAS
IMPROPER, SUCH FEES HAVING BEEN TESTIFIED TO
AND BEING ALLOWABLE PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW.

The court indicates that the rationale behind the
sua sponte motion to reopen and accept affidavits on attorney's fees as being the confusion which resulted from the
uncertainty which existed as to the triable issues caused by
Respondent's own counsel.

During the trial,

Respondent

Girard made several attempts to aimend the complaint and add
additional causes of action, most of which had occured long
after the suit was initiated.

Although the court noted

Appellants' continuing objections to all testimony pertaining
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to matter outside of the relevant insurance questions, it
allowed such testimony to enter into the record and reserved
its ruling on those issues until judgment.

As a result, the

Appellants spent a large part of the trial defending the
lease and forfeiture thereof by resisting issues not properly
before the court.
Under paragraph 12 of the lease, the Defendants/
Appellants are entitled to attorneys fees as a result of
trying a case for several days defending their position that
the lease should be upheld and not forfeited. To deny Appellants their attorney's fees by finding them in default
ignores the testimony of Doug Labrum, called by the Respondents, which testimony clearly establishes, as preserved in
the partial transcript, that Appellants had cured the default
within the 30 day grace period allowed by the lease, and
prior to the filing of suit. (P-3,

~13;

PT Labrum's testimony,

seriatum, R-1 showing suit filed May 8, 1978)
Yet another reason for denying Appellants' attorney's
fees is equally fallacious, that is, that they were not
expended in establishing a breach of one of their leasehold
rights by Respondent.

One such right is stated in 49 Am.

Jur. 2d, Landlord & Tenant, §330, p.344 as follows:
[T)he rule now established by nearly all
courts is that the ordinary lease of realty,
if valid, and executed by a .Person capab+e of
making such a covenant, raises an implied
covenant that the lessee shall have the quite
and peaceable possession and enjoyment of the
leased premises . . . unless there is some
express covenant of a more limited character
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inconsistent w1 th a judicial covenant of
quiet enjoyment, an express stipulation 111
the lease that nothrng therein contained
should be construed to imply a covenant for
quiet en]oyment, or a statutory provision,
which is applicable to leases, abohshino
implied covenants.
,
None of these exceptions to the established rule
of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment apply in the
instant case.

No evidence was presented at trial to shew

that that lease was invalid or that it was not executed bi

3

person capable of making a covenant of quiet enjoyment, nor
is there any provision in the lease itself restricting
lessees'

right to quiet enjoyment,

and no Utah statute

applicable to leases abolishes implied covenants in leases
for real property.
There is, therefore, in the lease before the court
an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment of the leasehold
premises,

and in defending against Respondent Girard' s

attempt to forfeit their leasehold interest, Appellants were
clearly enforcing their rights pursuant to the terms of the
lease as implied by law.

As stated by the Utah Supreme

Court rn Heywoodv. Odgen Motor Car Co.,

266 P. 1040 (Utah

1928):
The written lease does not contain an express
covenant of quiet enjoyment. It is, however,
quite generally held that a covenant of quiet
enjoyment by the lessors is implied in every
lease for a term of years.
Id. at 1042.
The Hevwood case was cited for this same proposition in
Sandall v. Hoskins,

137 P.2d 819

(Utah 19·±3), and this

holding has never been reversed.
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As Appellants successfully defended their rights
of quiet enjoyment during trial, they are entitled to a
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in upholding their
rights under the lease, and the sum of $2,000 as a reasonable
sum for such attorney's fees was testified to at the trial
and was not objected to by counsel for Plaintiffs.

Clearly,

this amount should be awarded to Appellants, and assessed
against the Respondent Girard.
CONCLUSION
Four Plaintiffs initially filed suit in the instant
case claiming a breach of a lease by the alleged failure of
lessees to maintain insurance on the premises as called for
therein.

Lessees received notice of this problem in mid-March

of 1978 though all the parties to the lease were previously
aware of it.

The testimony of an insurance agent called on

the Lessors' behalf at trial established, however, that the
Lessees had obtained insurance by reason of a binder being
issued on March 20, 1978 and thus had timely cured this
default within the parameters of the lease.
Despite this, on May 8, 1978, when there was complete insurance coverage on the premises, the Lessors filed a
verified complaint seeking a forfeiture of the lease as well
as a temporary injunction mandating that no operation of the
leased premises occur without the existence of valid insurance
coverage.
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In September of 1978, the court issued a preliminary injunction on the nominal bond of $500 ordering the
Lessees to maintain insurance throughout their operation of
the leased premises.

A final policy of insurance was issued

approximately at that time.

By November of 1980, three of

the four named plaintiffs in the suit were desirous of
dismissing the action and instructed their attorney, Mr.
Ronald Boutwell,
Appellants'

to do so.

attorney,

Mr.

Mr. Boutwell, together with
Hughes,

executed a stipulation

reflecting this intent on December 8, 1980.
The

remaining plaintiff,

Salli

Smith Girard,

proceeded to trial seeking therein to amend her cause of
action and proceed on theories not properly before the
court.

The Appellants below successfully defended their

right to quiet enjoyment of the leasehold and the court in
its discretion sustained Appellants' objections to evidence
and exhibits pertaining to issues not formally framed in the
pleadings.
At the end of the Appellants'

defense,

their

attorney, under oath, testified to a reasonable attorney's
fee of $2, 000.

The Respondent Girard' s attorneys cross-

examined in an attempt to belatedly establish a reasonable
attorney's fee on their client's behalf.
findings and order,

In its initial

the lower court reflected that the

Respondent Girard' s attorneys had presented no evidence
whatsoever on the issue of attorney's fees.

Nonetheless,
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the court sua sponte reopened the matter to allow the Respondent Girard yet one more day in court to present this evidence.
This appeal sets forth those reasons in law and in
equity upon which the Appellants feel Mrs. Girard's rights,
if any, should be deemed waived or denied.

In the instant

case, the true nature of the adversary system was thwarted by
the independent arbiter's assuming the position of Respondent's advocate and then subsequently awarding her attorney's
fees.
The Respondent Girard chose to bear her burden of
proof once the court had unjustifiably reopened the case on
her behalf by the filing of controverted affidavits.

These

affidavits are at best weak evidence of an appropriate attorney's fee.

Furthermore, one of the affidavits is filed by

Mr. Boutwell, who at the time of trial, neither represented
Mrs. Girard nor appeared as an attorney in the matter.

In

short, his affidavit states what a reasonable attorney's fee
for his services would be, but does not allude to whether
Mrs. Girard is obligated to him for that amount or whether
that amount has in fact ever been paid.
Beyond seeking reversal of the court's award of
attorney's fees to the Respondent Girard, Appellants strenuously urge that the attorney's fees expended by them in
sustaining the lease and in upholding their rights of quiet
enjoyment, which are implied under the laws of the State of
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Utah, should be granted.

These fees, contrary to those of

the Respondent Girard, are based upon sworn testimony which
was properly subject to cross-examination.

It is the

posit1o~

of the lessees that as a result of a lengthy trial in which
they were successful at defending their rights to the leasehold, the lessees are equitably entitled to an award for
attorney's fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of August,
1981.
ALLEN, THOMPSON & HUGHES
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Attorney for Defendants/Appe lants
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